Within the framework of an overlapping generations model with two-sided altruism and endogenous growth, this paper calculates the rates of fertility, output growth, child-rearing cost, saving, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, bequest and gift, and compares the equilibrium solutions under different public pension systems. It proves that the fully-fertilitylinked public pension system (FFLPPS) is equivalent to the system without public pension (WPPS), and the partly-fertility-linked public pension system (PFLPPS) is equivalent to the conventional public pension system (CPPS). The CPPS is beneficial to developing countries in promoting economic growth and reducing population. It is necessary for developed countries to weigh gains and losses carefully if they hope to transform their CPPS (or PFLPPS) to the FFLPPS.
This paper extends Nishimura and Zhang (1995) and Zhang and Zhang (1995) . It uses an endogenous growth model to compare the system without public pension (WPPS), the conventional public pension system (CPPS), the fully-fertility-linked public pension system (FFLPPS) and the partly-fertility-linked public pension system (PFLPPS). It assumes that altruism is two-sided: children give gifts to parents and parents leave bequests to children. It calculates not only the rates of fertility, gift, saving, consumption, but also the rates of output growth, bequest, net intertemporal transfer and child-rearing cost.
Bequests are sizeable wealth in real life. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) report that 80% of U.S. household wealth is inherited wealth. Abel and Warshawsky (1988) and Zhang and Zhang (2001) classify bequest motives into altruistic, exchange, joy-of-giving and accidental motives. In fact, it is hard for most people to distinguish bequest motives clearly when they leave bequests to their children. Abel and Warshawsky (1988) analyze the joy-of-giving bequest motive in which the utility obtained from leaving bequests depends only on the size of the bequests. They exploit the fact that this formulation can be interpreted as a reduced form of the altruistic motive for most purposes. Zhang and Zhang (2001) prove that altruistic and exchange motives yield equivalent outcomes if the discount factors are set the same. Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) consider accidental bequests as a determinant of the representative individual's utility function. This paper also takes bequests as a determinant of the representative individual's utility function.
Following Saint-Paul (1992) , Zhang and Zhang (1995 , 1998 , 2001 , Wigger (1999a Wigger ( , 1999b and so on, this paper adopts the endogenous growth model with Romer's (1986) type of capital externality. It is tractable to compare the balanced growth equilibrium solutions of the system without public pension (WPPS), the conventional public pension system (CPPS), the fully-fertility-linked public pension system (FFLPPS) and the partly-fertility-linked public pension system (PFLPPS).
Within the framework of an overlapping generations model with two-sided altruism and endogenous growth, this paper obtains some interesting results that have not appeared in the literature. It proves that the rates of fertility, output growth, child-rearing cost, saving, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, bequest and gift under the FFLPPS are the same as those under the WPPS. The rates of fertility, output growth, child-rearing cost, saving, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, bequest and gift under the PFLPPS are the same as those under the CPPS. The FFLPPS is equivalent to the WPPS, and the PFLPPS is equivalent to the CPPS.
The rates of fertility and child-rearing cost under the CPPS (or PFLPPS) are smaller than those under the FFLPPS (or WPPS).
II. The Basic Model: The System without Public Pension (WPPS)
Individuals. Individuals live for two periods. The generation born at the beginning of period t is called generation t. Each individual of generation t earns wage income by supplying inelastically one unit of labor, receives bequest income from his parent, consumes part of his incomes, rears his children, gives his parent gifts, and saves the rest of his incomes in his work period or first period. In his retirement period or second period, he consumes part of the sum of his savings and gifts received from his children, and leaves the remaining part as bequests to his children.
Each individual of generation t derives utility from his work-period consumption . The representative individual maximizes his utility by choosing the rates of saving, gift, fertility in work period and the rate of bequest in retirement period:
where t W denotes the wage, t s the saving rate, t g the gift rate, and 1 t r the interest rate.
where 1 t b denotes the ratio of the bequest to the wage per worker of generation t+1 2 , which is called the bequest rate for simplification. The child-rearing cost rate is assumed to be:
where t n is the fertility rate, 
Firms. Firms produce a single commodity in competitive markets. The production function 
where t w is the wage rate per unit of effective labor. In order to ensure the existence of a balanced growth path for the economy, the following particular form of t A is adopted (see, e.g., Saint-Paul, 1992; Zhang, 1995, 1998; Wigger, 1999a Wigger, , 1999b etc.) :
where a is a positive technological parameter.
Therefore a k t , and
The Goods Market. The goods market equilibrium requires that the demand for goods in each period be equal to the supply:
The Equilibrium Solutions. Combining equations (7), (8), (9), (10) 
Substituting equation (8) into the production function and using a k t
gives that the growth rate of output per worker is equal to the growth rate of capital per worker. From equations (7) and (9), one can get the growth rate of wage:
A balanced growth equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which the saving rate, the gift rate, the fertility rate, etc., are constant, but the wage, the work-period consumption t t C , the retirement-period consumption t 1 t C , etc., grow at the same endogenously determined and constant growth rate of capital per worker.
Lagging equation (3) and substituting equations (2)- (5) into equation (1), differentiating equation (1) with respect to
gives the first-order conditions for the maximization problem of equations (1)- (3):
Equation (13) means the tradeoff between the marginal utility of work-period consumption and that of retirement-period consumption through savings. Equation (14) means the tradeoff between the marginal utility of the representative individual's work-period consumption and that of his parent's retirement-period consumption through gifts. Equation (15) means the tradeoff between the marginal utility of child-rearing costs and that of net transfers from children to parent. Equation (16) means the tradeoff between the marginal utility of retirement-period consumption and that of bequests left to children.
Equating equations (13) and (14), inserting equation (3) and using equation (12) yields:
Dividing equation (15) by equation (13) yields:
where b g W is the rate of net intertemporal transfer in equilibrium.
Substituting equation (17) into equation (11) 
where
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (13) yields:
Substituting equations (18), (19) and (20) into equation (2) yields:
Substituting equation (3) into equation (16), and using equation (12) yields:
(23)
III. The Stationary Optimal Allocation
The government maximizes the balanced growth welfare 4 by choosing the stationary optimal rates of saving, gift, fertility and bequest, and sets a rational pension level according to the optimal rate of net intertemporal transfer. Therefore the government solves the following maximization problem:
Manipulation analogous to section II gives the optimal solutions:
Therefore the government sets the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension tax rate as p W .
IV. The Conventional Public Pension System (CPPS)
Under the PAYG public pension system, the government levies pension tax
worker in period t, and pays pension benefits to each retiree in the same period.
The pension benefits are related to the average social fertility rate under the CPPS. Taking the public pension level as given, each individual may give extra gifts to his parent, leave extra bequests to his children and choose the other variables deviating from the optimal allocation. Each individual maximizes his utility by choosing the rates of saving, gift, fertility and bequest. Thus the representative individual solves the following maximization problem:
(1) subject to:
where at n is the average social fertility rate and is equal to t n in equilibrium.
Manipulation analogous to section II gives the equilibrium solutions:
where W is the rate of net intertemporal transfer excess of p W , or the rate of net intertemporal transfer outside of the CPPS. The total rate of net intertemporal transfer in the equilibrium of the CPPS is W Wp . And g p W is equivalent to the total gift rate in the equilibrium of the CPPS.
V. The Fully-fertility-linked Public Pension System (FFLPPS)
The public pension benefits are completely dependent on individual fertility rate under the FFLPPS. Taking the public pension level as given, each individual additionally gives his parent gifts during his work period and leaves bequests to his children during the retirement period. The net intertemporal transfers outside of the FFLPPS depend on the following computation instead of discussions such as Nishimura and Zhang (1995) and Zhang and Zhang (1995) . Each individual maximizes his utility by choosing the rates of saving, gift, fertility and bequest. Thus, the representative individual solves the following maximization problem: (1) subject to:
The equilibrium solutions are: 
VI. The Partly-fertility-linked Public Pension System (PFLPPS)
Under the PFLPPS, the pension benefits include two parts: one is related to the average social fertility rate; another one is dependent on the individual fertility rate. Taking the public pension level as given, each individual additionally gives his parent gifts and leaves bequests to his children. The net intertemporal transfers outside of the PFLPPS depend on the following computation instead of discussions. Each individual maximizes his utility by choosing the rates of saving, gift, fertility and bequest. The representative individual solves the following maximization problem: (1) subject to:
The equilibrium solutions are:
where W is the rate of net intertemporal transfer excess of W Wp , or the rate of net intertemporal transfer outside of the PFLPPS. The total rate of net intertemporal transfer in the equilibrium of the PFLPPS is
is equivalent to the total gift rate in the equilibrium of the PFLPPS.
VII. Comparison of Different Equilibriums
Comparing the above equilibrium solutions gives: holds for the four systems. Thus the behavior of work-period consumption rate can represent that of the retirement-period consumption rate and that of the lifetime consumption rate in the four systems. Of course, this result holds in equilibrium.
Equations (59)- (66) give the following result.
Result 1. The rates of fertility, output growth, child-rearing cost, saving, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, bequest and gift under the FFLPPS are the same as those under the WPPS. The rates of fertility, output growth, child-rearing cost, saving, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, bequest and gift under the PFLPPS are the same as those under the CPPS.
This result means that the fully-fertility-linked public pension system is equivalent to the system without public pension, and the partly-fertility-linked public pension system is equivalent to the conventional public pension system.
Equations (59) and (61) yield the following result.
Result 2. The rates of fertility and child-rearing cost under the CPPS (or PFLPPS) are smaller than those under the FFLPPS (or WPPS).
Some developed countries are suffering from low fertility. It seems that the FFLPPS may be useful to the developed countries. Zhang and Zhang (1995) make such a suggestion. However, it is necessary for this paper to explore further.
Equations (60), (63), (64), (65) and (66) give the following result.
Result 3. The rates of output growth, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, bequest and gift under the CPPS (or PFLPPS) are greater than those under the FFLPPS (or WPPS).
Equations (69), (67) and (68) give the following result. Equation (67) means that the gifts outside of the PFLPPS are exactly equal to the bequests outside of the PFLPPS. Equation (68) implies that the gifts outside of the FFLPPS are less than the bequests outside of the FFLPPS.
Equation (70) gives the following result.
Result 5. The gift rate under the WPPS is the largest. The gift rate outside of the public pension system under the CPPS is larger than that under the PFLPPS, which in turn is larger than that under the FFLPPS.
Equations (71), (72) and (73) 
Some results of this paper are different from Nishimura and Zhang (1995) because their model is an exogenous model with one-sided altruism and without growth. Among the limited comparable results, the main differences are as follows:
x Difference 1. In Nishimura and Zhang (1995) , the fertility rate under the WPPS is equal to that under the CPPS, which is larger than that under the FFLPPS. However, in this paper, the fertility rate under the FFLPPS (or WPPS) is larger than that under the CPPS.
x Difference 2. In Nishimura and Zhang (1995) , the rate of net intertemporal transfer under the FFLPPS is larger than that under the CPPS and that under the WPPS. However, in this paper, the rate of net intertemporal transfer under the FFLPPS (or WPPS) is smaller than that under the CPPS (or PFLPPS).
x Difference 3. In Nishimura and Zhang (1995) , the saving rate under the FFLPPS is larger than that under the WPPS, which in turn is larger than that under the CPPS. However, in this paper, they are identical.
This paper shows that the rates of fertility and child-rearing cost under the CPPS (or PFLPPS) are smaller than those under the FFLPPS (or WPPS). Zhang and Zhang (1995) also obtains that the fertility rate under the CPPS is lower than that under the WPPS. The result, the fertility rate under the CPPS is lower than that under the FFLPPS, is different from that of Nishimura and Zhang (1995) .
This paper also indicates that the rates of output growth, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, bequest and gift under the CPPS (or PFLPPS) are greater than those under the FFLPPS (or WPPS). Some comparison results concerning these rates are different from those in Nishimura and Zhang (1995) and Zhang and Zhang (1995) . The differences have been shown in the last section.
The above main results have valuable policy implications. For example, the CPPS has a relative advantage to the PFLPPS based on the equivalence of the two systems. The compulsory public pension tax rate under the CPPS is lower than that under the PFLPPS. Therefore the CPPS is easier to carry out than the PFLPPS, especially for the developing countries.
The FFLPPS has a relative advantage to the WPPS based on the equivalence of the two systems. One of the basic functions of a public pension system is to prevent individual myopia. The FFLPPS has the function, while the WPPS has not. It is almost impossible for any country that has established a public pension system to abolish it.
It is better for the developing countries that have not established public pension systems to introduce the CPPS because it can promote economic growth, restrain population explosion, reduce the child-rearing cost rate, and increase the consumption rate. Zhang and Zhang (1995) make the same suggestion based on the rates of fertility and output growth.
It is necessary for developed countries to weigh gains and losses if they hope to transform their CPPS or PFLPPS 5 to the FFLPPS. Although the FFLPPS can increase the fertility rate, it may decrease the economic growth rate, increase the child-rearing cost rate, reduce the consumption rate, etc. Thus it is better for a developed country to transform its CPPS (or PFLPPS) to the FFLPPS if it cares more about the problem of population ageing and low fertility than the others. Otherwise it is suitable to maintain the CPPS (or PFLPPS). This is different from Zhang and Zhang (1995) .
